龚楚：浅论以贸易方式洗钱的黑客诈骗

2020-05-26

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浅论以贸易方式洗钱的黑客诈骗

On Hacking Fraud with Money Laundering via Trade

摘要

本文作者列举其律师执业过程亲身触及的几个案件，分析以贸易方式洗钱的黑客诈骗的特点、犯罪手段、犯罪路径、等等，指出我国警方加强打击此类犯罪的必要性，提出了具体的刑事办案方式方法的建议，并强调面对黑客诈骗犯罪重在预防。

Abstract

In this article, the author will analyse the features, measures, routines and other aspects of hacking fraud crime disguised as trade to launder money that he has dealt with during his legal career. He will do so by highlighting several cases on which he has worked. The author will emphasize the need for the Chinese police to crack down with stronger force on this category of crime. He will propose more effective methods for the police to deal with the criminals. Finally, the author will emphasize the vital importance of risk prevention in the face of hacking fraud.

作者

龚楚律师

广东虎戈律师事务所创始人

中国人民大学国际法博士

执业方向：涉外争议解决

电邮：director@lawyerchina.org

联系方式：13590496399 （微信）

The Author

Gong Chu (Oscar)

PhD. In Law, Renmin University of China

Practice scope: Dispute resolution

Email: director@lawyerchina.org

Mobile: 13590496399 (WeChat)

一、前言

I. Preface

笔者在涉外律师执业过程中涉及为数不少的“通过贸易合同方式进行诈骗或洗钱”的黑客犯罪，其特点是技术性、复杂性、隐蔽性、时效性、跨国性。此类犯罪在察觉、补救、报案、追查等方面的难度大大超过以下二类国际贸易诈骗犯罪：1. 国内犯罪分子具有主观诈骗故意的收钱不发货或提供假冒伪劣产品；2. 国外犯罪分子具有主观诈骗故意的收货后不付款或少付款（直接不付、少付或故意找借口不付、少付）。笔者在此列举几个案例，予以介绍和分析，并提出建议。

As a lawyer, I have been involved with a number of cases of hacking fraud, in which the criminals use trade contracts to commit fraud and/or launder money. These crimes feature technical skill, complexity, stealth, timeliness and international crime. This category of crime is significantly more difficult to perceive, remedy, report and prosecute than the following two categories of international trade fraud: a. Chinese criminals who fail to deliver goods or who deliver bogus or substandard products, with the intention to defraud; b. Overseas criminals who pay no money or who pay less under various pretexts. Hereinafter, I will detail actual cases and will explain and analyse these, whilst proposing more effective interventions.

二、案例

II. Cases

（一）英国机械公司被黑客诈骗案

A. A British machinery company defrauded by hackers

这是正常贸易形式下被黑客拦截诈骗的类型。

This was an example of hacking fraud in which the money was intercepted and defrauded during normal trade processes.

该案中英国机械公司作为买家向中国卖家购买一批设备，付款后通知卖家并请求按购销合同的约定生产及发货。卖家稍后回复，没有收到货款。经查，英国公司在付款前突然收到“买家”的新指示，借口原银行账户因故不再用于收款，请付款到另一个指定账户；买家不疑有他，付款到第二个账户。再查，第二个账户实际上跟卖家无关。买卖双方此时均惊觉遭遇了诈骗。

In this case, a British machinery company placed an order to purchase from a Chinese seller. After wire transferring their payment as agreed in their contract, the British company notified the seller, asking to proceed with the manufacture and delivery of the goods. A short time later, the seller advised that the money had not arrived. On investigation, it was found that shortly before the British company made its payment, it had received instruction directing the payment to an alternative bank account. The notification stated that the former bank account, due to some reason, was not used to receive payment anymore. The British company followed the instruction and their payment was unwittingly made to the fraudulent account. Further investigation revealed that the fraudulent bank account was unrelated to the original Chinese seller. Both parties understood at this point that they had been victims of hacking fraud.

查电子邮件发现，发出新指示的电子邮箱是英国公司聘请的中介人所有。中介人可信、清白，他也不知实情。

On examining the email correspondence, it was noted that the fraudulent payment instruction was sent to the British company from its China-based agent, however the agent was also innocent and knew nothing of the hacking fraud.

案发后，受害人英国公司委托中国律师进行报案及处理；律师又发现：新收款账户属于一家福建进出口公司，它为一家境外公司收款后，按境外公司指示分几笔打给不同的中国供应商私人账户或公司账户；之后各收款人或收款公司均按照境外公司与其签署的贸易合同提供普通货物并报关出口。

The lawyer was entrusted by the victim to report the fraud to the Chinese police and to follow up the investigation. The lawyer discovered that the fraudulent bank account belonged to an import/export company in Fujian Province. This company had paid this money onwards to the private and company accounts of various Chinese suppliers, whilst these recipients then exported commodities to overseas buyers using formal sales contracts and making normal customs declarations.

本案中“境外公司”就是黑客犯罪集团所控制或操纵的；中介人的电子邮箱早被黑客控制。

These overseas buyers are controlled or manipulated by hacking fraudsters. The email account of the agent for the British company was found to have long been controlled by the fraudsters through hacking.

（二）东莞欧洲企业被黑客诈骗案

B. A European enterprise in Dongguan defrauded by hackers

这是企业集团内部正常转账过程中被黑客诈骗的类型。

This case details a hacking fraud committed against two enterprises from one corporation, which occurred during their routine money transfers.

东莞欧洲企业是一家制造业工厂，母公司是一家以欧洲某国为总部的跨国企业，因生产经营经常需要往来汇款。母公司财务人员在向东莞子公司账户汇款的过程中，收到子公司财务同事改付到另一个账户的“指令”，于是向另一个账户支付了数目巨大的一笔资金。子公司财务人员发现问题后，立即向上司报告。上司立即到实际收款账户开户总行所在地的深圳市报案，并聘请律师协助与警方沟通。经查，实际收款人账户是一家浙江公司所有，收款后按黑客指示转出。

The European enterprise in Dongguan is a manufacturing company, while its parent company which has its headquarters in a European country is a transnational business group. For reasons related to production and management, the parent company regularly sends money to the subsidiary companies, including the aforementioned in Dongguan City. On one occasion, prior to wire transferring the money, the finance department of the parent company received instruction to transfer the money into an alternative account. They did as instructed, transferring a large sum. The subsidiary’s finance team discovered the error and reported it immediately to their bosses, who then travelled directly to Shenzhen City to report to the police station which governs the Chinese bank’s headquarters into which the money was sent. The investigation uncovered a false receiving account, which was opened with this bank’s branch office in Zhejiang Province by a company located there. It was this company that had sent out the fraudulently obtained money, as instructed by the hackers.

子公司财务同事的邮箱并未发出指令，细看之下，母公司财务人员收到的邮件来自一个高度相似的其他邮箱，仅有个别字母不同。如，将同一个郁闷的前缀”workwithchina”改成”workvvithchina”。当工作人员进入邮箱收件并回复时，不易察觉来信邮件地址有字母W和VV的差别。

The email account from which the new instruction was believed to have been sent out, was proved to be fraudulent. This email account’s address was almost identical to that of the finance department of the subsidiary company, being only one English letter different. For example, the hacker changes “workwithchina" before the domain name to “workvvithchina” and it is not easy to distinguish when the owner enters the email box to check and reply letters.

（三）黑客诈骗集团借国际贸易洗钱

C. Money laundering using the cover of international trade

这一类型是黑客诈骗金钱（不一定是贸易货款）得手后，通过跟国际贸易进行洗钱。

This category details the crime of money laundering carried out by hackers, using the purchase of goods from mainland China or other countries/regions following receipt of money from their victim. The fraudulently obtained money is not necessarily used for purpose of international trade by the victim.

该类犯罪的作案手法和路径是：黑客侵入一国受害人的电子邮箱，伺机诈取款项汇入另一个国家或地区的银行账户（比如香港等自由港）。之后，黑客从他们控制的这些银行账户或代收款的银行账户中，转账到跟他们签订了正常贸易合同的中国大陆或其他国家和地区外贸供应商的账户，获得货物并销售后，取得“合法收入”。

This category of hacking crime is accomplished as follows: the hacker illegally accesses the email account of a victim in one country and waits for the opportunity to fraudulently direct money into a bank account in another country or region, such as a free harbour city like Hong Kong. The hacker then directs the money through the accounts of the exporter according to the trade contracts signed, receives the commodities and sells them on, receiving the ‘legal income’.

笔者接手的一个案件是声称注册于中欧某国的黑客公司购买中国大陆单位或个人在香港开设的空壳公司。这些大陆背景的香港公司在港没有实际办公室，通过港府承认的商务代理秘书协助打理。但它们都开有在港银行账户，否则黑客集团不会购买。购买带有银行账户的在港公司成功之后黑客集团迅速将资金骗到被收购在港公司的账户，并立即以该香港公司的名义，向大陆外贸供应商下订单购买货物，出口转销，完成洗钱行为。

In one case with which I dealt, a hacking group who claimed that they have a company registered in a central European country bought companies for sale established by mainland Chinese individuals or groups in Hong Kong SAR or other countries/regions. These companies normally do not have physical offices, but they are administrated by commercial agents recognized by the Hong Kong government and all of these companies for sale have bank accounts. It is these features that make them purchase targets for hackers. After they have completed the purchase of such companies, the illegally obtained funds are directed into these accounts, followed by trade contracts being signed, funds transferred into the sellers’ accounts, and ending in exporting the commodities and selling them on. This accomplishes the money laundering.

不料，该案中黑客操作过急（或者实际情况根本不允许他们按部就班操作），其中一个香港公司转让协议虽已签署、转让费已支付完毕、董事也已更名，但该司银行转账的离岸账户操作U盘和密码仍在转让方手里，未移交。由于资金巨大，手机入账信息引起转让方董事的怀疑，于是不肯配合黑客指示进行转账。

On occasion, the hackers were exposed either by failing to be in step with the company or by attempting to work too hastily. One Hong Kong company, despite the purchase agreement has been signed, transfer payment has been paid, change of directors’ names has also been done, its former director still holds the bank wire U disk and the code to operate it at hand, was alerted by the mobile message notifying big sum of money arrival, and refused to send it out under the hacker’s instruction.

黑客联系到笔者，支付一笔咨询费后一通瞎编误导律师，要求笔者去做转让方董事的工作，令其配合转款，愿付高额手续费，也愿意支付巨额律师费。笔者联系了转让方董事、公司转让的中介方，初步了解情况后，根据多年涉外律师工作经验判断其不是合法分子，当即拒绝进一步为其提供法律服务。

The lawyer was contacted directly by the hacker, who paid a legal consultation fee and told untruths about the situation, requesting that the lawyer communicate with the seller, telling them to complete the financial transfer and promising a high remuneration fee to both the seller and the lawyer. After discussing the situation with the seller and the intermediary working on the transfer from the Hong Kong company to the fraudsters, the lawyer judged that the individual was a fraudster and part of a hacking group, and thus refused to work for him any further.

除上述案件情况特殊之外，实践中大量黑客诈骗款成功通过中间公司（无论收购或委托收转款）下单并转账的方式，以国际贸易形式完成洗钱行为。

Except in such unusual circumstances as these, many hackers successfully pay trade orders by transferring money from the company accounts they have purchased, or those whom they have entrusted to transfer the money. Thus, the fraudsters accomplish money laundering using the cover of international trade.

三、分析和建议

III. Analysis and suggestions

（一）警方应抓住黄金时间争取最大额度的减损

A. The police should act swiftly to significantly decrease the victims’ losses

1. 黑客犯罪的时效性决定了一旦诈骗既遂，财产极短时间内就会被转移。事后追究虽然能实现司法正义，但受害人的实际损失已经发生，无法弥补。黑客诈骗的第一步就是通过银行汇款获得赃款。一般来说，银行的解付汇款分为“总行清分、分行清分、支行入账”三个步骤，快则1-3天，慢则3-7天。受害人应抓住时间，立即报案，促成警方迅速前往银行查封赃款。

1. The nature of hacking crime determines that the fraud is enacted, and the assets moved, in a very short timeframe. It is possible to achieve justice after the event; however, it is far less likely to result in the recovery of the victims’ losses.The first step in accomplishment of any hacking fraud is money transfer. Generally speaking, any bank in mainland China must complete three steps with regards to bank wire: head office sorting-out at national level, branch office sorting-out at city level, and sub-branch office entry-passing at town level, which takes 1 to 3 days at best and 3-7 days if moving slowly. Victims are advised to report the fraud to the police immediately and to urge the police to freeze any money defrauded directly with the bank.

2. 《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》、《公安机关办理刑事案件程序规定》、《最高人民法院、最高人民检察院、公安部关于办理电信网络诈骗等刑事案件适用法律若干问题的意见》均要求警方“提高办案效率”、“及时查明犯罪事实”，但实际接警的派出所对法律规定认识不够，且办理此类案件经验不足，往往延误时机，客观上为黑客犯罪集团赢得转移赃款或洗钱的时间。比如笔者代理的欧洲企业东莞子公司报案一事，某银行深圳总行所在地的基层派出所不予以立案，认为收款行在浙江省，要求受害人前往浙江省某市报案。推挡之间，2天时间过去，赃款已被转到香港某银行账户。根据经验可知，赃款也会被迅速再次转离香港。最后这笔赃款很可能表现为拖鞋或牙刷出现在非洲的丛林里。该派出所的做法是违反法律规定的，涉嫌渎职。刑诉法第84条明确规定：公安机关对于报案、控告、举报，都应当接受。对于不属于自己管辖的，应当移送主管机关处理，并且通知报案人、控告人、举报人；对于不属于自己管辖而又必须采取紧急措施的，应当先采取紧急措施，然后移送主管机关。

2.The Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, Provisions on the Procedures for Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs and Opinions of the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Handling of Telecommunications Network Fraud and other Criminal Cases all require that the police improve their working efficiency and timely investigation of crimes. However, at a local level, police officers are showing insufficient recognition and understanding when they are contacted by victims of fraud. These local officers lack understanding of the relevant laws, and lack experience of prosecuting crimes of this type, which eventually leads to the lost opportunity to recover the victims’ financial losses. This lack of support for the victims can even be described as facilitating the fraudsters in hiding the money or accomplishing the money laundering. For example, in the case of the European enterprise in Dongguan, the police station governing the area where the Chinese bank’s headquarters in Shenzhen believed that, since the money-receiving bank account was opened with a branch bank office in Zhejiang Province, the victim should go to a police station there to complain. The length of time spent communicating with policemen at the police station in Shenzhen led to two days passing, by which time the money had already left mainland China for Hong Kong. From experience the lawyer can predict that the money left Hong Kong immediately, possibly with the result that this defrauded money showed up in the form of slippers or toothbrushes in a remote area of a country in Africa. I suggest that the way of dealing with fraud victims as seen with the Shenzhen police station is contrary to that laid down by Chinese law, constituting dereliction of duty. Article 84 of the Criminal Procedure Law clearly regulates that: ‘The public security service shall accept all reports, complaints and information. If a case does not fall under its jurisdiction, it shall refer the case to the competent service and notify the person who made the report, lodged the complaint or provided the information. If the case does not fall under its jurisdiction but calls for emergency measures, it shall take emergency measures before referring the case to the competent organ.’

3. 在笔者代理的另一个跨境黑客诈骗案件（联合国前雇员所办的美国公司汇往另一国的工程投资款被骗）中，之所以追赃成功，归功于浙江省某地警方反应较快。律师接受委托后前往收款人账户所在地，当晚深夜民警接案，通知刑警大队负责人接待报案律师。翌日公安分局领导召集开会，律师电话连线美国受害公司负责人，令在场公安干警相信属实，当天查封收款账户，最终挽回一半损失（另一半已被转离国境）。该市警方全程未质疑和刁难律师的授权手续（电子版打印的授权书、护照、所函、律师证），是有法律依据的：刑诉法第84条“任何单位和个人发现有犯罪事实或者犯罪嫌疑人，有权利也有义务向公安机关、人民检察院或者人民法院报案或者举报。因此，报案律师即使不提供公证认证的授权文件，也有权作为公民举报犯罪行为。

3. In another case, the lawyer represented a US citizen who was a former UN employee and is now running a company in the USA. The individual was to send capital for an engineering project to a Nigerian partner. The money defrauded was partially recovered and credit should be given to the quick reactions of local police in Zhejiang Province. After the victim engaged this law firm, the lawyer travelled to the city where the money was sent and reported the case to the police station governing the area where the bank was located. The duty policeman notified his superior who was responsible for criminal investigation and the superior quickly attended, despite it being midnight. The very next morning the police leaders of the sub-bureau there held an emergency meeting. During the meeting, the lawyer spoke on the telephone with the victim (who was abroad at the time) in the presence of the policemen, to demonstrate to those present that he was indeed the victim of a legitimate fraud. The police froze that bank account the same day, which enabled the lawyer to recover half of the financial losses suffered. During the entire process the police did not question the legality of the lawyer’s Power of Attorney. The Power of Attorney (POA) contains a printed version of POA from its electronic version, a copy of the passport of the victim’s company’s president, the law firm’s letter of introduction, and a copy of the lawyer’s certificate. The police acted correctly and in-line with the law. Article 84 of the Criminal Procedure Law also states: ‘any unit or individual, upon discovering facts of a crime or a criminal suspect, shall have the right and duty to report the case or provide information to a public security service, a People's Procuratorate or a People's Court.’ This gives right to the lawyer to complain against any crime even he does not have a power of attorney without notarization and embassy certification done in the USA.

（二）企业应加强风险防范，规范财务行为

B. Companies must take more robust risk prevention and standardize their financial behaviors

1. 跨境付款实践中，要保证每一笔汇款都先行确认，是难以做到的。但是，如果一方突然改动收款账户，即刻进行确认是可行的。此时绝不可继续使用电邮询问（已被黑客控制）；应采取各种其他方式进行确认，包括电话、视频、等等。

1. It is unrealistic to carry out verification before every single cross-border transaction is made. However, should a party involved suddenly change its receiving account information, verification of any new account should occur instantly. Continuing to utilize email to verify security should be forbidden, as the email account is by then already under the control of the hackers. Telephone call verification, video call verification and other alternative options are recommended.

2. 卖方不宜轻易变动收款账户。上述英国机械公司之所以被骗，正是因为卖家要求新交易不再用第一个账户（账户A），改用第二个账户（账户B），黑客借机发邮件引导买家付款到第三个账户（账户C）。卖家之所以要求改用账户B，是因为它自己没有外汇收款账户，代收款的A账户公司手续费高，它想换到更低廉的B公司账户，结果被黑客以C公司账户更低廉为借口诈骗成功。

2.The seller must not be allowed to change their beneficiary account easily. Taking the example of the British company in Case 1, the fraud was instigated when the seller demanded the use of an alternative bank account (Account B) by blocking the use of the original account (Account A). The seller did this by stating that the commission fee charged to Account A was too high. The hacker took advantage of this information using the pretext that Account C was even lower in commission fee and thus successfully defrauded the British victim.

3. 加强网络安全，及时更新邮箱密码等设置。黑客是网络技术高手，无孔不入。举一个恐怖的例子：笔者作为律师的邮箱和贝宝账户密码都曾被黑客攫取。受害人发现被诈骗后从墨西哥发来电邮联系本律师。黑客居然一路跟着，暗暗盯着受害人和律师之间的交流，在转账支付律师费时，把钱引导支付到了黑客控制的银行账户。之后，墨西哥当事人询问律师工作进度，双方才知道他再次被骗。在另一个案件里，黑客甚至侵入律师贝宝账户，按照贝宝规则，以投诉的方式令贝宝公司冻结律师户头个人款项，同时控制了律师贝宝注册邮箱，使得贝宝公司发来的投诉提示函被直接划入垃圾箱，笔者蒙在鼓里。期限满后，贝宝视为投诉成功，将所冻结的资金划给黑客。普通人在技术上无法对抗黑客，唯有尽力采取自己能做到的防护措施，力争最大限度保护邮箱和网络安全。

3.Internet safety must be prioritized, such as keeping passwords and codes updated. Hacking fraudsters are experts in internet technology, anywhere and everywhere in the online world. Another worrying example was when my working email account and PayPal account were both hacked by fraudsters. A fraud victim in Mexico contacted the lawyer via email for help. This communication was hacked, the hacker reviewed the conversation between the victim and lawyer, and subsequently redirected the victim to submit their legal fee to the hacker’s chosen destination. Days later when the Mexican client contacted the lawyer for an update, the lawyer realized he had been defrauded again. In another case, a hacker invaded another of the lawyer’s email accounts, creating correspondence from PayPal that would automatically send directly into the lawyer’s spam folder. The hacker subsequently, following the rules set down by PayPal, lodged a false complaint against the lawyer by posing as a PayPal user. As the lawyer did not see the PayPal notification emails in the spam folder related to this complaint, eventually the lawyer’s personal funds were allotted to the hacker once the reply time had expired according to PayPal’s rules. As we can see, ordinary people are equally as exposed to hackers as large organizations, the only thing we can do is take individual measures to protect our email accounts and improve the safety of our other internet-related transactions.

4. 规范财务行为，代收代付需高度谨慎。以最近发生的一家德国公司被黑客诈骗为例，其索取退款被拒后，正聘请香港律师起诉一家大陆商家设立的香港公司，因其为了赚取手续费代收代付，包括几笔黑客转来的款项。该公司即使刑法上能脱离罪责，民事程序上也会惹上麻烦，得不偿失。

4.Standardization of financial behaviors is of vital importance, both for individuals and companies. One must always be careful to receive and transfer money safely and appropriately. Taking a recent fraud case as an example, a German company retained a law firm in Hong Kong to sue a second company after its request for a refund was rejected. A factory in mainland China set up a company in Hong Kong SAR which received and paid out money to other parties, in order to make a commission fee. This included money defrauded by hackers. In this instance, if the company can rid itself of its penal responsibilities, it must face other prosecution, such as a civil lawsuit. Surely these actions are not worth the trouble of potential legal prosecution.

5. 出口企业要不厌其烦地提醒买家有关汇款注意事项，宁愿先行采取各种确认手段，保证收款安全。

5.Companies exporting goods or services must make their customers aware of the risks of cross-border money transfers and provide safe processes for the transfer of money, using a range of verification measures.

（三）国内警方联动、国际刑警合作

C. Domestic police assistance and international police cooperation

黑客犯罪可能是侦破率最低的犯罪类型之一。如发案初期不能挽回经济损失，又需要继续办案，就需要做两件事情：1. 国内各地公安机关联合行动。2. 各国警方合作追查。

Hacking crime has a much lower success rate of being solved by the police when compared with many other categories of crime. Once the case has passed the early stages, if the victim’s financial losses are not recovered and there is a need to pursue a penal investigation, two things are required: a. domestic police coordination and assistance; b. international police cooperation.

1. 国内警方联动

a. Domestic police coordination

根据《最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理诈骗刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释》第一条的规定，利用电信网络技术手段实施诈骗，诈骗公私财物五十万元以上的，应认定为刑法第二百六十六条规定的“数额特别巨大”。黑客在国际贸易中的涉案款项一般都构成“数额特别巨大”，上述案例中的涉案金额是五十万元标准的几十倍甚至上百倍。按我国刑法规定，属于大案，有必要也应该追查，捍卫我国警方国际形象及我国司法尊严。

Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in the Trial of Criminal Cases on Swindling regulates in Article 1 that a sum of money defrauded at fifty hundred Yuan or above meets the criterion of an ‘especially huge amount’. This is regulated by Article 266 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China in criminal cases using telecommunication technology to defraud. The sum of money involved in hacker fraud using trade transactions to do money laundering generally meets this criterion, and the fraud cases listed previously in this article involve significantly more valuable assets, sometimes even more than one hundred times larger. These fall into the category of ‘major cases’, which must be investigated and pursued in order to safeguard the image of the Chinese police also the Chinese justice system.

黑客诈骗以外的普通型贸易诈骗（中国人以贸易为名诈骗外国人财物），严重损害我国声誉，我国警方也应一并加强打击。

Trade fraud other than hacking must also be cracked down on forcefully by the Chinese police. This would include Chinese individuals or groups defrauding foreign nationals or foreign companies while disguising the fraud as trading. These cases can seriously damage the reputation of our nation and must incur strong police intervention.

银行转账有序可查，警方追溯款项去向不存在技术难题。接到报警后，如第一时间无法冻结款项，从收款行分批转付出去的款项，仍是可以查封冻结的。由于办案人员的人身移动需要时间，异地警方如能迅速配合，效率就极大提高。

Wire transfers between banks are inherently traceable and police are easily able to trace the defrauded money. Even if the first transaction does not result in the account being frozen, it is highly possible that the money laundering transfers that follow can be identified and frozen. Since the movement of police force from one city to another takes time, police in another city, if they can cooperate in a timely manner, can increase the efficiency of the police investigation greatly.

2. 国际刑警合作

b. International police cooperation

国际刑警合作在黑客犯罪预防和打击方面，暂时算是一种蓝图。根据笔者经验，以香港为例，香港警方执法素质好，为人民服务意识强，即使律师以电子邮件发报案函，港警都会予以立案调查，但实际效果并不好。黑客以银行直接划拨方式转款是一路留下痕迹的，理论上可以查；黑客以贸易形式把赃款变成货物运离中国的，也留下痕迹，也可以查。但，各个国家警方针对个案的合作，难度大。

International police cooperation with regards to hacking crime crackdown and hacking prevention is still only a blueprint for the time being. Taking the Hong Kong SAR police as an example, from my experience, the Hong Kong SAR Police are good with the quality of their law enforcement, and they make me believe that they prioritize serving the people. They usually are ready to file a case immediately after the lawyer only sends out a complaint email. However, the practical outcomes of the Hong Kong SAR Police investigations can be unsatisfying. It should be possible to trace the hacking criminals who have directly moved the money away or who have used trade to facilitate money laundering, but the degree of practical cross-border cooperation can prove variable on a case-by-case basis.

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